Two fundamental hypocrisies in the Japanese and the US views of corporate stakeholders must be addressed for the world’s largest economies to continue to prosper and lead in the 21st century. The US must dedicate itself to protecting and empowering its workers, and Japan must do the same for its shareholders.
Japanese workers have traditionally been expected to remain at the same company from the time they are hired out of college until retirement, working long days and taking little vacation. For their hard work and loyalty to the firm, they receive comprehensive benefits, a generous pension upon retirement, and most importantly, job security. The tradeoff is that they receive on average less compensation than they might receive at a similar position at a
Compensation in
In Japan, investing in general and stock investing in particular are widely considered akin to gambling, this aversion probably best exemplified by the fact that Japanese investors account for less than half of the market capitalization of the Japanese equity market, with foreign investors making up around 60%.
Shareholders are seen as short-term speculators, placing bets on the growth of companies and their stock prices and moving their money out the moment they have made a profit. As a result of this perception, little emphasis is placed on paying dividends, with Japanese firms tending to hold on to extra cash instead of redistributing it to shareholders. The average dividend yield, a relative measure of dividend earnings, for all companies making up the Japanese TOPIX was 1.98% in September 2008, compared to 2.62% for companies forming the US S&P 500 during the same month. 0.64% is by no means a nominal difference – compounded annually over ten years on an initial investment of it $1,000 it translates into added dividends of $65.88, or more than 6% of principal.
In the US, employees are also viewed as important assets, but much more as tradable, commoditized assets similar to inventory, physical assets and capital and not in the intimate familial sense of Japanese firms. Employees are only as valuable as their contributions to the company, and while compensation is often linked to these contributions in the form of “meritocratic” compensation schemes, employees may also lose their jobs more easily if they fail to perform or if their services can simply be acquired more cheaply through outsourcing arrangements resulting in downsizing.
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The reason that “shareholders rights” are championed in the
But what is the problem with executives and shareholders, who have both made clear contributions to corporate profits and growth, being proportionally rewarded for their efforts? The first is that it is usually only a small percentage of employees aside from executives who are given stock options. While some companies do make SOPs, or “stock ownership programs,” available to employees, these require employees to use their own wages to purchase a stake in the value of the company that they themselves have created – a profoundly counterintuitive concept.
But the larger and more glaring hypocrisy is that the same logic is not applied to the compensation of employees of the company, and in fact often the very opposite logic applies.
While US firms pay lip-service to meritocratic compensation, pay scales are rarely if ever made known to employees, and instead of the comprehensive disclosure standards used in information regarding share prices, employee compensation is treated in most cases with ferocious secrecy. The very idea of making compensation standards public to employees would be considered laughable to most executives.
For a true meritocracy to exist, objectivity and transparency are essential, just as they are regarding the compensation of shareholders. In other words: If I make this level of contribution to the company, I can expect this level of compensation; I expect those making similar contributions to receive similar compensation, those contributing less to receive less, and those contributing more to receive more. This is the exact logic employed for shareholders, so why not for the company’s other equally important stakeholders, the employees? The answer is again the same, greed. While the rights of shareholders are aligned with the interests of the executives, they are at odds with the rights of the employees.
The problem is that they are not made publicly available to all employees, as equity disclosures are made available to all shareholders. Executives take advantage of certain employees ignorance of their own value and lack of negotiating skills to tamp down costs. This culture of secrecy is exactly what fuels “personnel arbitrage” in the
If employees were made aware of company-wide compensation structures and the individual compensation of fellow employees, those employees receiving unfairly low compensation would rightly seek redress. This would mean increased payroll costs, decreased earnings, and difficulty for executives to meet financial targets, leading to reduced compensation for themselves in the short-term. In the long-term, it would lead to increased retention and more motivated employees who took greater pride and passion in their work.
While global cost competition can not be denied as a large factor in the decline of certain
There is also a stark double standard in the Japanese view of stakeholders that stands almost in diametric opposition to the
Traditionally, Japanese firms have sought to marginalize instead of empowering shareholders, particularly so-called activist shareholders who seek to influence or dominate corporate policy by controlling majority blocks of shares and the proxy voting rights accompanying them. This tendency is best evidenced by the 2007 Bull Dog Sauce case, in which the Supreme Court of Japan blocked the attempted takeover of Bull-Dog Sauce Co. by the
In 2007, Steel Partners tried to acquire a 100% stake in the sauce maker Bull-Dog Sauce. It should be stated here that Steel Partners’ intentions at the time were not considered to be benevolent: many thought it would threaten to sell off Bull-Dog’s individual assets upon acquisition, forcing Bull-Dog to buy back any shares Steel Partners might acquire at a premium to the bid price before the deal was completed, or wait for a “white knight,” a bidder friendly to Bull-Dog who would do the same. Neither of these outcomes would result in any added value for Bull-Dog, while only resulting in profits for Steel Partners.
When Steel Partners initiated its tender offer on May 18, 2007 for all of Bull-Dog’s shares, Bull-Dog responded with a “poison-pill” defense, the legality of which in terms of shareholders rights would form the basis of the Supreme Court case. In a poison-pill defense, the takeover target, in this case Bull-Dog, issues rights to a large number of shares to shareholders other than the bidder, which may be converted into shares should any one bidder, i.e. the initiator of the takeover (Steel Partners), acquire a given percentage of outstanding shares, typically slightly less than a majority. The result is that it becomes more difficult for the initiator of the takeover bid to acquire enough shares to control a majority stake in the target company and in doing so influence or control its corporate policy. The term poison pill, a reference the suicide pills taken by spies at the time of enemy capture to prevent interrogation, refers to the point at which the bidder has acquired enough shares to force the issuance of share rights to other shareholders to block the takeover, in effect “killing” the deal and the bidder.
The issue that would be decided by the Supreme Court was whether the poison-pill defense constituted shareholder discrimination by offering rights to certain shareholders and not others, specifically Steel Partners. Following is an excerpt from the ruling (translated from the Japanese by the author):
Despite having no true intentions of participating in the management of the target company, as so-called abusive acquirers (emphasis added) seek only to inflate share prices of the target company and force members of the target company to then reacquire them at the inflated price etc., in the interest of abusive corporate management or control and without sound management motives, causing a loss in corporate value and negatively affecting the interests of the shareholders of the target company, these abusive acquirers may face shareholder discrimination.
What is most important here is not the specific motives of Steel Partners in its acquisition, be they abusive or otherwise. Rather, it is the fact that, in its definition of “abusive acquirers,” the Supreme Court of Japan has created a subjective standard for the legal institutionalization of shareholder discrimination.
The fact that Steel Partners was also a foreign firm caused the foreign media to view the Bull-Dog case as one of the largest set-backs for foreign investment in Japan’s history and as having the potential to scare off more well-intentioned foreign investors. The Financial Times offered the following on this perceived set-back in a October 2007 article entitled, Poison pills cause upset among foreign investors:
The million-dollar question everyone is asking is whether
Many foreign investors, who cannot afford to wait for an answer, have reduced their presence in
But if shareholders are nothing but fly-by-night vultures seeking quick profits by destroying otherwise good companies, why should they be given an equal voice?
The inherent hypocrisy in this point of view is that, if you have no interest in paying fair dividends, are unconcerned about your share price and take no issue with discriminating against your shareholders, than you have no business being a public company. As a private company you would be free to reinvest earnings instead of disbursing them as dividends, make decisions irrelevant of their effect on your share price, and be much more insulated against takeovers. So why do firms such as these list? The answer is again greed. While not interested in their shareholders interests or opinions, many Japanese firms are still more than happy to take their money.
While foreign investors indeed account for the majority of investment in the Japanese equity market, according to benchmark data from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, foreign direct investment into
The reality is that personnel and capital are the two most important assets of any company, and an equitable approach to the two most important stakeholders, employees and investors, is key to the success of any company.
The
By 2050
The solution will be multi-faceted: it must include a fundamental change in the way Japan views immigrants; it must provide a legal structure that allows workers, most importantly women, to balance work with the ability to raise a family; and it must facilitate a faster shift from a manufacturing-driven economy to one fueled by true innovation.
It must also encourage investment, both by Japanese individuals who can no longer rely solely on the government and corporate pensions to fund their retirement, and by foreign countries and companies seeking the opportunity to invest in
The
Best exemplified by the Meiji Restoration and post-war reconstruction,